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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Case No. 20050192-CA
vs.
GEORGE WALLACE,
Defendant/Appellee.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Whether the court incorrectly refused to bind over charges for theft by deception
and passing a bad check where evidence amply showed that defendant knew the checks
would not be paid? "The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant over for
trial is a question of law. Accordingly, we review that determination without deference to
the court below." State v. Clark. 2001 UT 9, Ijl 8, 20 P.3d 300 (internal citations
omitted). This issue was preserved by the court's order dismissing the charges (R. 13033).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
All controlling statutory provisions are set forth in the Addenda.

1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
The State appeals the magistrate's refusal to bind over George Wallace on charges

that he committed theft by deception, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-405 (count 7) and that he issued a bad check, a third degree felony, in
violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1) (count 9), in the Fourth Judicial District
Court.

B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
George Wallace was charged by information filed in Fourth District Court on or

about October 10, 2003, with theft by deception, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405 (counts 6 and 7); communications fraud, a second
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1801 (counts 8 and 10);
issuing a bad check, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6505(1) (count 9); and pattern of unlawful activity, a second degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-1603 (count 11) (R. 1-4).
A preliminary hearing was held on April 7, 2004, before the Honorable Steven L.
Hansen (R. 38-39; 138). After evidence was presented, the magistrate took the matter of
bindover on all charges under advisement (R. 138: 81-83). Wallace moved to dismiss all
counts (R. 44-50). Following a hearing, the magistrate issued a memorandum decision
granting Wallace's motion and dismissing all counts (R. 81-90; 92).
The State moved to reconsider the matter, to which a second memorandum
decision was issued wherein the magistrate found that the State's motion was without
merit (R. 93-108; 128).
2

On January 31, 2005, the magistrate issued its order dismissing all charges (R.
130-33). The State filed a notice of appeal on February 24, 2005. (R. 135).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Count 71 - Theft by Deception
On July 18, 2002, Deborah Wallace phoned Sharon Warner, an employee of
Morris Murdock Travel, and asked Warner to get eleven tickets for flights the next day to
Hawaii (R. 138: 46-48). Warner, with Morris's vice president's approval, agreed to
procure the tickets and asked for cash. Deborah Wallace said she did not have the money
at that point, but that she would on Tuesday. Deborah Wallace then asked Warner if she
would take a check and hold it until the following Tuesday (R. 138:48). Specifically,
Warner testified that Deborah told her: "Well, I don't have that much money right now,
but I will on Tuesday. So if you can just take this check, post-date the check until
Tuesday, I will have the funds here" (R. 138: 48).
Warner procured the tickets and George and Deborah Wallace, brought a check to
Warner's home in the amount of $11,496.30 to pay for the tickets (R. 138: 13-14, 47-49).
Warner testified that when they brought her the check, the Wallaces gave her a hug and
said'Thank you. We really appreciate this. We owe you tickets to Hawaii. We'll get
you over to Hawaii to see us sometime" (R. 138: 49).
Although the check was pre-dated July 17, 2002, both parties agreed that the check
would not be cashed until the following Tuesday (R. 138: 48-49). Warner knew that the

1

The State's Statement of Facts addresses other counts with which Wallace was
charged. Since the State is not disputing that the evidence regarding those charges
was insufficient to bind Wallace over for trial, those facts are not relevant and will not
be addressed here. (Br. of Appellant at 3-6, 9-10).
3

Wallace's were planning on moving to Hawaii at some point, but she did not know when
(R. 138: 51).
The following Tuesday, Warner called the bank to verify the funds were in the
bank, but the Wallace's had not received the money they were expecting, and Warner was
told by the bank that there were insufficient funds in the account to cover the amount of
the check (R. 138: 49-50). Warner called Deborah Wallace in Hawaii and told her that
the check would not clear (R. 138: 50). Deborah Wallace explained that they were
expecting the money any time and to hold off a few more days and call the bank again (R.
138: 50). After a few weeks, Warner deposited the check and it was returned due to
insufficient funds (R. 138: 50).
Warner testified that she did not remember specifically whether she ever talked to
George regarding the insufficiency but that she thought on at least one occasion she
talked directly with George (R. 138:51). However, Warner testified that it was "usually
Debbieff that she spoke with regarding the check (R. 138:51).
Morris Murdock Travel turned the check over to its legal department, and Lynette
Ambrose, a paralegal with Morris Murdock Travel, spoke with Deborah Wallace on
several occasions regarding the debt (R. 138: 53-54). Ambrose also testified that she
never spoke directly with George Wallace regarding the insufficient checks, but that there
were times when Deborah Wallace would turn and ask someone a question-presumably
George-before she responded (R. 138:54). Ambrose testified that Morris Meetings, a
subsidiary of Morris Murdock Travel, also organized arrangements with the Wallaces
again in September 2002 in order to attend a Nu Skin convention (R. 138: 54-55). The
Wallaces gave Morris Meetings two more checks totaling $1,860 for the convention,
which were also returned for insufficient funds (R. 138: 54).
4

Toby O'Bryant, an investigator for Utah County, also testified that the check made
to Morris Murdock Travel by the Wallaces was returned for insufficient funds (R. 138:6,
13).

Count 9 - Issuing a Bad Check
The Tradewinds Estate ("Tradewinds") is owned by Mr. David Thielen (State's
Exhibit 1 - 1102 statement of Peggy Young, Tradewinds' booking agent).2
O'Bryant testified that on July 19, 2002, George Wallace wrote a check in the
amount of $3,096.84 to Tradewinds to cover rent on the Tradewinds estate for the time
period of July 19, 2002 - July 31, 2002 (State's Exhibit 1). O'Bryant testified that the
check was presented and returned for insufficient funds (R. 138:17).
No further testimony was given during the preliminary hearing regarding this
check. Further, this issue was not raised or discussed in the defense's motion to dismiss
(R. 43-50) or the State's opposition to motion to dismiss (R. 51-61).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The magistrate correctly concluded that the State failed to provide sufficient
evidence to bind counts 7 and 9 over for trial. In order to bind over George Wallace for
trial, the State had to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that
Wallace committed theft by deception, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-405
and that he issued a bad check, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-505(1).

2

The 1102 statement of Peggy Young, bearing on count 9 (State's Ex. 1) was received
without objection (R. 40; 138:18-19).
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However, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
belief that Wallace committed theft by deception by acting as an accomplice and
encouraging and aiding his wife to commit acts which constituted the crime of theft by
deception. Further, the State failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a reasonable
belief that Wallace obtained the right to occupy Tradewinds' property by writing a check
that he was reasonably certain would not be paid.
Accordingly, the magistrate correctly refused to bind Wallace over for trial and
Wallace requests that this Court uphold that decision.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT-AS MAGISTRATE-CORRECTLY REFUSED
TO BIND WALLACE OVER FOR TRIAL ON COUNTS 7 & 9
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
THAT HE COMMITTED THE CRIMES OF THEFT BY DECEPTION
AND ISSUING A BAD CHECK
The State acknowledges that it failed to produce sufficient evidence to support a
reasonable belief that George Wallace committed the offenses charged in counts 6, 8, 10
and 11 (Br. of Appellant at 13-14). However, as to counts 7 and 9, the State argues that
Wallace's history of debt and poor business decisions and his practice of making lulling
statements establish reasonable belief that Wallace knew that the account on which the
checks were written and given to Morris Murdock Travel and Tradewinds would have
insufficient funds. Wallace asserts that the State's argument is speculative and without
merit; and therefore, is not a basis with which to overturn the magistrate's ruling since
the State failed to produce any evidence that Wallace believed there would be
insufficient funds to cover the check issued by Deborah Wallace to Morris Murdock
6

Travel. In fact, the only evidence the State presented regarding Wallace's mental state
was that he rightfully believed there would be sufficient funds to cover the check.
Accordingly, the magistrate correctly declined to bind Wallace over for trial.

A.

The Bindover Standard
At a preliminary hearing, it is the State's burden to produce evidence ''sufficient

for the magistrate to find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has been
committed and that the defendant committed it." State v. Schroyer, 2002 UT 26, ^ 10,
44 P.3d 730 (citations omitted). Further, the prosecution must produce believable
evidence of all the elements of the crime charged to sustain its burden at the preliminary
hearing stage." Id. (citations omitted). Stated differently, "the prosecution must present
sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief'that an offense has been committed
and that the defendant committed it." State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, ^j 16, 26 P.3d
223 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
Under the standard set forth in State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, 20 P.3d 300, all the
evidence and "all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom" are to be viewed "in a light
most favorable to the prosecution." Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51 at ^ 20 (citing Clark, 2001
UT 9 at ^| 20). If the evidence gives rise to alternative inferences, but the only
reasonable inferences support the State's case, the magistrate must bind over the
defendant. See Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ^J 20. However, if the "evidence is wholly lacking
and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
prosecution's claim," the defendant should not be bound over for trial. Schroyer, 2002
UT26atTJ10.

7

B.

The State failed to produce adequate evidence that Wallace committed the
crime of theft by deception.
Wallace was charged with theft by deception, a violation of Utah Code Annotated

§ 76-6-405. A person is guilty of theft by deception if: (1) the person obtains or
exercises control over property of another by deception and (2) with a purpose to
deprive him thereof Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-405. According to Utah law, " [deception
occurs when a person intentionally creates or confirms by words or conduct an
impression of... fact that is false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is
likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6401(5)(a)); or when a person intentionally "promises performance that is likely to affect
the judgment of another in the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend
to perform or knows will not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform
the promise in issue without other evidence of intent, or knowledge is not sufficient
proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be
performed" (Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(e)).
The State claims that the only issue before this Court is "whether the evidence
was sufficient to support a 'reasonable belief that defendant knew the $11,496.30 check
to Morris Murdock would not be paid" (Br. of Appellant at 16).
The State's argument is unsupportable by its own evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing. The State presented evidence that both Wallace and Warner,
Morris Murdock Travel's agent, clearly understood that there were insufficient funds in
the account on July 18, 2002 (R. 138: 48). The State also presented evidence that
Warner understood that she was not to try to cash the "check" until the following
Tuesday (R. 138:48).

8

The State asserts that Wallace's history of bad debt should be a basis to provide
reasonable belief that Wallace knew he would not have sufficient funds to cover the
check written to Morris Murdock Travel (Br. of Appellant at 18-22) and the fact that
"none of defendant's purported expectations produced any payments to his victims nor
did any proceeds from his purported ventures protect his bank accounts from
involuntary closures" (Br. of Appellant at 22), should be enough to prove that he did not
intend to perform or knew the promise that he made to Morris Murdock Travel would
not be performed.
Additionally, the State ignores the magistrates Memorandum Decision, wherein
the magistrate found that the State presented evidence that Wallace expected "to receive
a substantial sum of money from an investment and there was no evidence presented by
the State contrary to this representation" (R. 87). The magistrate further found that the
State could not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of insufficient funds and
a failure to pay (R. 86). Clearly, the magistrate found that the State failed to produce
sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that the funds would be insufficient
(R. 146-47).
In an effort to hide the fact that the State failed to meet its burden regarding
intent, the State asserts the theory that George Wallace was acting as an accomplice to
his wife (Br. of Appellant at 23). The State asserts that the prosecutor presented
evidence that showed that George Wallace encouraged and aided his wife in committing
acts that constitute the elements of the crime charged, when he elicited from Warner the
testimony that George Wallace had accompanied his wife in delivering the check and
had assisted his wife in lulling Warner and Ambrose (Br. of Appellant at 23).

9

The State would have the magistrate make a quantum leap, with no evidence
presented, that George Wallace "encouraged, probably requested, and definitely aided
his wife to obtain the tickets from Warner" (Br. of Appellant at 24). The State would
have the magistrate ignore the fact that Wallace believed he would be receiving
sufficient money to cover the "check" issued to Morris Murdock Travel. The State
argues that the duty to "view evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution"
means to ignore reasonable inferences favoring the defense. However, the State failed
to present sufficient evidence to support any reasonable belief that George Wallace
committed the offense of theft by deception. Specifically, there was no evidence
presented by the State which would support a reasonable belief that Wallace
intentionally engaged in deception against Morris Murdock Travel.
One, the State's own witness, Warner, testified that she agreed to hold the check
for a while and that she was informed by Deborah Wallace that they were expecting to
shortly have money to cover the check (R. 138: 48-50). No evidence was introduced
that George Wallace knew that the money to cover the check would not be received.
Accordingly, the State failed to produce any evidence of deception under Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-401 (5)(e) which provides that deception occurs when an individual
intentionally "Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in
the transaction, which performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will
not be performed; provided, however, that failure to perform the promise in issue
without other evidence of intent, or knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did
not intend to perform or knew the promise would not be performed." All the evidence
indicates that at the time Deborah Wallace issued the check and made arrangements for
Morris Murdock to hold the check, both Wallace's fully expected that they would have
10

money to cover the check. Moreover, the mere fact that there ultimately was
insufficient funds to cover the check is "without other evidence of intent or knowledge
is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise
would not be performed." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-40l(5)(e).
Additionally, the State failed to establish the requisite element of deception under
the other applicable subsection defining deception which is Utah Code Annotated § 766-401(5)(a). This subsection indicates that deception occurs when an individual
intentionally "creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of... fact that is
false and that the actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the
judgment of another in the transaction." Neither employee of Morris Murdock or any
other witness produced any evidence that would support a reasonable belief that George
Wallace created or confirmed by words or conduct that Deborah's statements to Warner
in regards to the check were false or that he did not believe that there would be
sufficient funds to cover the check. In fact, both employees from Morris Murdock
testified to little—if any contact with George. Ambrose testified that she never spoke
directly with George (R. 138: 54). Warner testified that the initial call came from
Deborah and that most of her interaction was with Deborah (R. 138: 46-48, 50). Warner
also testified that she may have had a conversation with George but she testified as to no
specifics (R. 138: 51). Warner's only certain interaction with George was his presence
when Deborah brought the check (R. 138: 47-49).
Wallace asserts that this case is very similar to State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061
(Utah 1983) in which the Utah Supreme Court reversed a conviction for theft by
deception for insufficient evidence. In Lakey the defendant paid for clothing with a
check. However, he informed the seller that he should not cash the check immediately
11

because he would need a few days in which to make additional deposits so that the
check would clear. The defendant was expecting money from three investors, who had
assured him that the money would be paid imminently. The seller accepted the check on
these terms. Defendant's bank subsequently dishonored the check because of
insufficient funds. 659 P.2d at 1062.
The issue in Lakey~as in this case-was "whether property obtained by passing
what turned out to be a bad check was obtained 'by deception."' 659 P.2d at 1063.
Lakey, like George Wallace, was not prosecuted for the crime of issuing a bad check.
Id The Utah Supreme Court concluded that Lakey's conduct did not satisfy the
statutory definition of deception set forth in Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40 l(5)(a) and
(b) because at the time the transaction occurred the uncontradicted testimony was that
the seller had been informed that additional time was required to make additional
deposits for the check to be covered and that the seller had, nonetheless, agreed to this
arrangement. 659 P.2d at 1063-64.
The Utah Court also concluded that the evidence was insufficient to establish
deception under Utah Code Annotated § 76-6-40l(5)(e). In reaching this holding the
court stated
A person knows that a promise will not be perfonned 'when he is aware'
that the promise is 'reasonably certain' not be be perfonned. § 76-2-103(2).
Mere negligence is insufficient to satisfy this definition. The only evidence that
defendant was aware that his promised deposit of the necessary funds was
'reasonably certain' not to be perfonned was testimony that previous checks had
been bad and that the three investors defendant was counting on to contribute
cash had previously failed to do so despite repeated requests....
12

Lakey, 659 P2d at 1064.
Ultimately the Utah Supreme Court reversed the conviction for theft by deception
because the court was
unable to conclude that reasonable minds could believe that defendant committed
deception, as defined in the statute [on the date of the transaction]. While it is
true that the necessary deposit was not made, this is not a case where the jury
could find beyond a reasonable doubt that the party who promised the deposit had
no reasonable prospect of being able to make it—i.e., was 'reasonably certain' that
his promise would not be performed. Commercial misfortune is not a crime, and
there is no theft by deception without proof of deception.
Id.
Wallace asserts that although Lakey concerned the reversal of a jury verdict for
insufficient evidence as opposed to the decision of a magistrate, that the facts of this
case are sufficiently similar to the facts in Lakey to prevent any reasonable belief by the
magistrate-based upon the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing-to support the
requisite standard that Wallace committed the crime of theft by deception. Accordingly,
the magistrate correctly determined that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to
bind Wallace over for trial on count 7.

C.

The magistrate correctly refused to bind Wallace over for trial because the
State failed to present sufficient evidence that he committed the crime of
issuing a bad check*
The State argues that the magistrate failed to properly apply the bindover standard

to the charge that Wallace issued a bad check to Tradewinds (Br. of Appellant at 25).
The State further argued that the magistrate's findings were "clearly erroneous, and its
13

refusal to bind defendant over on this charge is incorrect" (Br. of Appellant at 25). The
State asserts that because the defendant's motion to dismiss did not discuss count 9, the
"logical response of the magistrate ... should have been to bind defendant over, if there
were sufficient facts to support the bindover" (Br. of Appellant at 25). The State then
asserts that there were sufficient facts presented at the preliminary hearing to bind
Wallace over for issuing a bad check. The State's argument, based entirely upon
unfounded speculation, is without merit and is not a basis with which to overturn the
magistrate's ruling since the State failed to produce any evidence that Wallace believed
there would be insufficient funds to cover the check issued to Tradewinds. In fact, the
only evidence the State presented regarding Wallace's mental state was that he rightfully
believed there would be sufficient funds to cover the check. Accordingly, the magistrate
correctly declined to bind Wallace over for trial.
Wallace was charged with issuing a bad check, a violation of Utah Code
Annotated § 76-6-505(1). Under that section, a person is guilty of issuing a bad check if:
(1) the person 'issues or passes a check ... for the payment of money"; (2) the person
passes the check "for the purpose of obtaining from any person ... any ... property, or
thing of value or paying for any services..."; (3) the person "know[s] it will not be paid
by the drawee"; and (4) "payment is refused by the drawee."
The State claims that the only issue before this Court is whether the evidence was
"sufficient to support a 'reasonable belief that defendant knew the $3,096.84 check to
Tradewinds would not be paid" (Br. of Appellant, at 26).
The State presented evidence that Wallace wrote a check on July 19, 2002 to
Tradewinds in the amount of $3,096.84 for rent for the remainder of July and that the
check was returned for insufficient funds (R. 138:17-18; State's Ex. 1). However, the
14

State failed to produce sufficient evidence relating to the element of the charge that
Wallace knew the check would not be paid by the bank. The State argues that because
the evidence shows that two checks were written within a two day period for large sums
of money from the same account that Wallace should have known the check he wrote
would be returned for insufficient funds. The State further asserts that Wallace's history
of bad debt and making of lulling statements should be a basis to provide reasonable
belief that Wallace knew he would not have sufficient funds to cover the check written to
Tradewinds (Br. of Appellant at 27).
However, the magistrate found that the State presented evidence that Wallace
expected "to receive a substantial sum of money from an investment and there was no
evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation" (R. 87). The magistrate
further found that the State could not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of
insufficient funds and a failure to pay (R. 86). Clearly, the magistrate found that the State
failed to produce sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that the funds would
be insufficient (R. 82; 86-87).
In State v. Clark, 2001 UT 9, the Utah Supreme Court combined two similar cases
where the magistrate applied the directed verdict standard and found the prosecution had
failed to provide sufficient evidence regarding the requisite intent to show a crime had
been committed. Id. at ^f 18. In both cases, the defendants attempted to cash forged
checks at local banks mere hours after those checks were reported stolen. Id. at ^| 19. In
both cases, after brief delays where the tellers did not immediately cash the check and
said that there were problems with the accounts, the defendants exited the banks
abandoning the forged checks. Id.

15

The Utah Supreme Court observed that in both cases, the facts gave rise to two
alternative inferences. Clark, 2001 UT 9 at ^| 20. The Court stated that the defendants
"may have simply assumed they had themselves been defrauded and, thus, felt there was
no reason to take the checks with them." Id. On the other hand, however, the Court
observed, "one could reasonably infer an intent to defraud," because if the defendants
were holders in due course, they "would have waited for approval rather than leaving" the
bank after a short delay. Id. Moreover, both defendants "presented checks only hours
after the reported thefts." Id.
While the Court found that the facts gave rise to two different inferences, it found
that the only reasonable inference was the one the prosecution was supporting. See Clark,
2001 UT 9 at K 20. Since the only reasonable inferences supported a probable cause
finding of guilt, the Court found sufficient evidence to bind over the defendants. Id.
The present case is distinguishable from Clark. Here, the State failed to produce
sufficient believable evidence that Wallace knew that there would be insufficient funds to
cover the "check" by the following Tuesday. In fact, the only evidence the State
presented regarding Wallace's mental state was evidence by way of Warner. Warner
testified that Wallace believed he would have sufficient funds by the following Tuesday
to cover the "check" made out on July 18, 2002 (R. 138: 48-50). Not at any point during
Warner's or any other witnesses' testimony did anyone testify that Wallace knew or
believed that there would be insufficient funds on the following Tuesday to cover the
"check." Moreover, Warner testified that Deborah Wallace explained that she was
expecting an investment to come through to pay for the "check" (R. 138: 50, 52). Not
one witness testified that Wallace lied. Therefore, there is a complete lack of evidence
relative to a necessary element of the charge.
16

The State attempts to infer that Wallace knew there would be insufficient money
by claiming that over two and one-half years, 254 checks were issued by George or
Deborah Wallace were returned for insufficient funds (Br. of Appellant at 19). However,
O'Bryant, the witness who provided the testimony of the 254 checks, lacked specific
knowledge as to the details of who wrote the checks, what was ultimately paid, or the
reasons for the overdrafts (R. 138: 21-22). The State also attempts to prove Wallace's
mental state by lambasting his history of debt and financial difficulties through repeating
in the Statement of Facts the circumstances surrounding the other charges which the State
concedes were properly dismissed (Br. of Appellant at 3-11). The mere accusation that
the Wallaces have had financial difficulties in the past is insufficient believable evidence
to establish that they were not expecting to receive sufficient money to cover the "check"
issued to Morris Murdock Travel.
The bulk of the State's brief is an attempt to discredit Wallace and his financial
history, believing this will provide reasonable belief that Wallace knew that a particular
investment would not come through. The State presented no evidence that Wallace knew
there would be insufficient funds to cover the "check." In fact, the State presented no
evidence regarding the investments that Wallace was relying upon. The State could have
easily investigated the investments Wallace was referring to in order to determine
whether there was a reasonable basis to believe that he would have sufficient funds to
cover the "check." Instead, the State relied solely upon unfounded inferences that
because the Wallaces had financial problems in the past, Wallace knew that there would
be insufficient funds to cover the "check." The magistrate correctly detemiined that these
unfounded inferences were insufficient to show that Wallace knew that the money would
not be there.
17

Like Clark, the facts in this case give rise to two alternative inferences. Either
Wallace knew that there really was no investment money coming, or Wallace rightfully
believed that money would be coming from the investments sufficient to cover the
"check." However, unlike Clark, the only reasonable inference to be drawn from the
State's own evidence supports the fact that Wallace believed he would be getting enough
money from the investments to cover the "check." Since there is only one reasonable
inference to be made, Clark required the magistrate to refuse to bind over Wallace for
trial.
Essentially, the State is seeking to relieve itself from the burden of showing
Wallace's mental state with regards to § 76-6-505(1). The State put on no evidence that
Wallace knew the money would not be there; however, the State asserts that because
Wallace gave a check with insufficient funds at the time the check was issued, and
because he had a troubled financial history, that is a sufficient mens rea showing of
probable cause that Wallace knew the check would be returned for insufficient funds.
If such a position were adopted, the fact that a person issued a check and it was
returned for insufficient funds would be all a prosecutor needs to bind a defendant over
for trial. Fortunately, such is not the requirement under § 76-6-505(1). Accordingly, the
magistrate correctly determined that the State failed to present sufficient evidence to bind
Wallace over for trial on count 9.
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Wallace asks that this court to affirm the decision of the trial court in refusing to
bind over the charges for trial for insufficient evidence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 3rd day of January, 2006.

Margaret P. Lindsay
Counsel for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I delivered four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing
Brief Of Appellant to Ken Bronston, Appeals Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East
300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, this 3rd day of
January, 2006.
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§ 76-6-401. Definitions
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Property" means anything of value, including real estate, tangible and intangible personal
property, captured or domestic animals and birds, written instruments or other writings
representing or embodying rights concerning real or personal property, labor, sendees, or
otherwise containing anything of value to the owner, commodities of a public utility nature such
as telecommunications, gas, electricity, steam, or water, and trade secrets, meaning the whole or
any portion of any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula or
invention which the owner thereof intends to be available only to persons selected by him.
(2) "Obtain" means, in relation to property, to bring about a transfer of possession or of some
other legally recognized interest in property, whether to the obtainer or another; in relation to
labor or services, to secure performance thereof; and in relation to a trade secret, to make any
facsimile, replica, photograph, or other reproduction.
(3) "Purpose to deprive" means to have the conscious object:
(a) To withhold property permanently or for so extended a period or to use under such
circumstances that a substantial portion of its economic value, or of the use and benefit thereof,
would be lost; or
(b) To restore the property only upon payment of a reward or other compensation; or
(c) To dispose of the property under circumstances that make it unlikely that the owner will
recover it.
(4) "Obtain or exercise unauthorized control" means, but is not necessarily limited to, conduct
heretofore defined or known as common-law larceny by trespassory taking, larceny by
conversion, larceny by bailee, and embezzlement.
(5) "Deception" occurs when a person intentionally:
(a) Creates or confirms by words or conduct an impression of law or fact that is false and that the
actor does not believe to be true and that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the
transaction; or
(b) Fails to correct a false impression of law or fact that the actor previously created or confirmed
by words or conduct that is likely to affect the judgment of another and that the actor does not
now believe to be true; or
(c) Prevents another from acquiring information likely to affect his judgment in the transaction;
or

(d) Sells or otherwise transfers or encumbers property without disclosing a lien, security interest,
adverse claim, or other legal impediment to the enjoyment of the property, whether the lien,
security interest, claim, or impediment is or is not valid or is or is not a matter of official record;
or
(e) Promises performance that is likely to affect the judgment of another in the transaction, which
performance the actor does not intend to perform or knows will not be performed; provided,
however, that failure to perform the promise in issue without other evidence of intent or
knowledge is not sufficient proof that the actor did not intend to perform or knew the promise
would not be performed.

§ 76-6-405. Theft by deception
(1) A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises control over property of another by
deception and with a purpose to deprive him thereof.
(2) Theft by deception does not occur, however, when there is only falsity as to matters having no
pecuniary significance, or puffing by statements unlikely to deceive ordinary persons in the group
addressed. "Puffing" means an exaggerated commendation of wares or worth in communications
addressed to the public or to a class or group.

§ 76-6-505. Issuing a bad check or draft-Presumption
(1) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the purpose
of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, knowing it will not be paid
by the drawee and payment is refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft.
For purposes of this subsection, a person who issues a check or draft for which payment is
refused by the drawee is presumed to know the check or draft would not be paid if he had no
account with the drawee at the time of issue.
(2) Any person who issues or passes a check or draft for the payment of money, for the purpose
of obtaining from any person, firm, partnership, or corporation, any money, property, or other
thing of value or paying for any services, wages, salary, labor, or rent, payment of which check or
draft is legally refused by the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check or draft if he fails to make
good and actual payment to the payee in the amount of the refused check or draft within 14 days
of his receiving actual notice of the check or draft's nonpayment.

(3) An offense of issuing a bad check or draft shall be punished as follows:
(a) If the check or draft or series of checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period
not exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is less than $300, the offense is a class B
misdemeanor.
(b) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $300 but is less than $1,000, the
offense is a class A misdemeanor.
(c) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than $5,000, the
offense is a felony of the third degree.
(d) If the check or draft or checks or drafts made or drawn in this state within a period not
exceeding six months amounts to a sum that is or exceeds $5,000, the offense is a second degree
felony.
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MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 031403946;JG31403948
vs.
Date: November 30,2004
GEORGE AND DEBORAH WALLACE,
Judge Steven L. Hansen
Defendant.

Before the Court is the Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. The Court, having reviewed and
considered all relevant memoranda and hearings, now makes the following ruling:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

Counts 1-5 of the Information apply to Defendant, Deborah Wallace.

2.

Counts 6-11 of the Information apply to Defendant, George Wallace.

3.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 1 with issuing a bad check, a second degree felony, for
a check that was written to Don Horton in the amount of $13,000 and for a $3,000 check
written to Edward Martinez. These checks were written on July 17, 2002. Mrs. Wallace
told both Mr. Horton and Martinez that her account lacked sufficient funds and instructed
them to wait a few days before cashing the checks, as she was expecting sufficient funds
to be deposited into her account. However, when the gentlemen attempted to cash the
checks, there was insufficient funds.

4.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 2, issuing a bad check, and Mr. Wallace, theft by
deception, for a check written by Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel in the amount
of approximately $ 11,000 on July 18, 2002. The check was dated July 17, 2002, and Mr.
Wallace asked the agent, Sharon Warner, to not cash the check for a few days because
there was not sufficient funds in the account that the check was drawn on, but that

sufficient funds were expected to arrive from a business deal. However, the sufficient
funds did not arrive and the check did not clear.
5.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 3 and Mr. Wallace in Count 8 for Communication
Fraud, which involves a transaction between Mrs. Wallace and Catryna Faux. Mrs. Faux
performed housekeeping services and Mrs. Wallace still owed her about $1,063 in back
wages. Mrs. Faux testified that while she lived in Springville, Utah she had loaned
money to Mrs. Wallace on three separate occasions. The first two loans were repaid, but
the third one, amounting to $1,129.32 was not repaid. Mrs. Faux and her husband then
voluntarily traveled with Mr. and Mrs. Wallace to Hawaii, with the promise of jobs.
While in Hawaii the Wallaces borrowed additional money from the Fauxs.

6.

In September 2002, the Wallaces persuaded the Fauxs to attend a NuSkin convention in
Salt Lake City, Utah. The Wallaces told the Fauxs that they would pay them $6,000
when they arrived at the convention, based upon monies the Wallaces were expected to
receive. When the Fauxs arrived in Utah, they learned the Wallaces did not receive the
funds and "that it was a big mess." Whereupon the Fauxs moved back to Utah, as they
could not afford to remain in Hawaii. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs. Faux testified that
"I know [the Wallaces] felt bad about not getting the money, and [Mrs. Wallace], you
know, in good will, said, 'We'll pay you back for those expenses.5" PLH Trans, at 67.

7.

Mrs. Wallace is charged in Count 4 and Mr. Wallace in Count 10 for Communication
Fraud. These charges stem from a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. The
Wallaces and the Stonelys entered into a contract for the sale of the Stonelys' home.
However, the defendants became delinquent in payments between September of 1997 and
June of 2002. In addition, the defendants also failed to pay property taxes. The Wallaces
were delinquent in the amount of $57,714.40. As a result of the delinquency, the
Wallaces signed a warranty deed, deeding the property back to the Stonelys "in payment
of all monies owing." PLH Trans, at 75.

8.

Mrs. Wallace is charged with Count 5 and Mr. Wallace with Count 11, Pattern of
Unlawful Activity, to include all other creditors that were not repaid by the Wallaces.

9.

Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 6, theft by deception, for an agreement he entered into
with Mr. Horton. Mr. Horton loaned the defendant $10,000 to make an investment. The

defendant was unable to repay Mr. Horton the principal or interest when the amount came
due.
10.

Mr. Wallace is charged in Count 9, issuing a bad check. However, the State fails to
provide the Court with sufficient facts to determine the nature of this charge.

11.

The Preliminary Hearing in this matter was conducted on April 7, 2004, after which the
Court took the issue of binding over the charges under advisement and to allow counsel
to brief the issue.

12.

The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, whereupon the State filed a motion in
opposition. Oral Arguments were held on October 19, 2004.

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
The purpose of a preliminary hearing is "ferreting out.. . groundless and improvident
prosecutions." State v. Virgin, 504 Utah Adv. Rep. 26, 27 (2004). In order to bind a defendant
over at a preliminary hearing, the Court must find that there is probable cause sufficient to
establish the "crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it." Id.
(citations omitted). "In making a determination as to probable cause, the magistrate should view
the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the
prosecution." Id. "The defendant should be bound over for trial unless the evidence is wholly
lacking and incapable of reasonable inference to prove some issue which supports the
[prosecution's] claim." Id. The State must present a "quantum of evidence sufficient to warrant
submission of the case to the trier of fact." State. Pledger. 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 (Utah
1995)(citation omitted).

L

Count 1, issuing a bad check, is dismissed because the checks were not written for value.
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check for events arising out of

checks that were written to Mr. Horton and Mr. Martinez on July 17, 2002, To support a charge
of Issuing a Bad Check, the State must establish that the defendant drafted a check for payment
with the purpose of receiving something of value knowing that the check would not be honored
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due to insufficient funds. The State supports its position based upon the insufficient funds.
However, the State must establish that the checks were written for exchange of value. Issuing a
check for exchange of value is an essential element that the State must satisfy. The State argued
that something of value was exchanged because the elimination of debt should be considered
value. This Court disagrees. The facts of the case clearly show that on July 17, 2002, when Mrs.
Wallace wrote the checks, neither Mr. Martinez or Horton were given any new value to the
defendants. See Howell Inc. v. Nelson, 565 P.2d 1147 (Utah 1977). It was nothing more than a
promise to pay in the future, without adding new or additional terms to previous agreement that
arose from the July 2, 2001 transactions. Therefore, the defendant's motion to dismiss Count 1 is
granted.

II.

Counts 2 & 7. Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the
State fails to establish misrepresentation by Mrs, Wallace, nor does the State establish
actual deception by Mr. Wallace.
Deborah Wallace is charged with Count 2, Issuing a Bad Check, and George Wallace is

charged with Count 7, Theft by Deception, for events arising out of checks that were written by
Mrs. Wallace to Morris Murdock Travel. The Defendant argues that because Murdock Travel
agreed to withhold depositing the check for a few days that the check falls out of the definition of
a check, which must be payable on demand, and that it should be regarded as only a promise to
pay in the future. The Defendant cites State v. Bruce, 262 P.2d 960 (Utah 1953) in support of her
position. In Bruce, the Utah Supreme Court stated that postdated checks did not fall under the
bad check statute, however, the statute applied if there was misrepresentation made at the time
the check was written. This Court finds that the State failed to present evidence sufficient to
establish probable cause to satisfy the essential element of misrepresentation.
This Court finds that the State supports its motion by showing the defendant wrote the
checks with the knowledge that there would be insufficient funds based upon the Wallaces'
history of debt. However, there was ample testimony at the preliminary hearing that the
Defendants were expecting to receive a substantial amount of money from an investment and
there was no evidence presented by the State contrary to this representation. The Defendant does
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not carry the burden at the preliminary hearing to provide evidence of the large payout, but rather
this burden rests solely upon the State to present some evidence that the Defendant's were
engaging in fraud by misrepresenting the statement of expecting a substantial sum of money
arriving from a business deal. The State must establish sufficient evidence that the Wallaces
were not relying on receiving money themselves in order to provide the sufficient funds. The
State must provide "some" evidence that Mrs. Wallace's expectation of receiving money was a
misrepresentation and the State can not meet its burden by merely presenting evidence of
insufficient funds and a failure to pay.
Moreover, as pertaining to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State is required to establish
some evidence that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that is false,
fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created or confirmed by words or conduct
that is not true, or promises performances that he does not intend to preform. Here, the State has
failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact
that Morris Travel would be repaid. The evidence at the preliminary hearing established that Ms.
Warner, an employee of Murdock Travel, dealt exclusively with the Defendant's wife and not the
Defendant. Therefore, since the State is unable to satisfy all elements of the charges, the
defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 2 and 7 is granted.

III.

COUNT 3 & 8, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State failed to establish
that the defendants devised a scheme or artifice to defraud the Fauxs of at least $5.000.
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for

events arising out of dealings with the Fauxs. To bind over for a charge of Communication
Fraud, a second degree felony, the State must establish that the defendants devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud another of at least $5,000 or something other than monetary value, and that the
events occurred in Utah County, Utah. The State contends that the Fauxs were defrauded out of
$7,286.83. At the preliminary hearing, Mrs, Faux testified that in Utah County the following
debts were made by Mrs. Wallace: $1,129.32 of which Deborah borrowed from Mrs. Faux to pay
for her son's rent-a-car, and for $1,063 in wages for Mrs. Faux's employment as a housekeeper in
Springville, Utah. However, based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing, the
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remaining transactions all occurred in Hawaii and not in Utah County, Utah and therefore those
transactions can not be calculated in the total figure to establish communication fraud.
Therefore, since the monetary value that was accrued in Utah County, Utah does not exceed
$5,000 the State is unable to establish probable cause as to all elements of the charge.
In addition, this Court finds that the debt that accrued in Utah County, Utah does not
amount to communication fraud. Based upon the testimony presented at the preliminary hearing,
it was established that on previous occasions that the defendants did repay money on previous
loans they owed the Fauxs, which is contrary to the State's position. Moreover, no testimony
was presented at the Preliminary Hearing to show that the Wallaces' expectation of funding was
fraudulent. Since intent to defraud is an essential element of Communication Fraud, and the
State failed to satisfy this element, this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss Counts 3
and 8, Communication Fraud.

IV

COUNT 4 & 10, Communication Fraud, are dismissed because the State has failed to
establish that the delinquent mortgage and tax payments was an intent to defraud the
Stonelys,
Both defendants are charged with Communication Fraud, a second degree felony, for

events arising out of a real estate transaction involving the Stonelys. To bindover a
communication fraud the State must satisfy its burden by presenting some evidence of a scheme
or artifice to defraud another by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, promises
or material omissions. However, the State supports its position by claiming that delinquent
payments is sufficient to establish communication fraud and that the defendants were spending
money to finish the basement instead of paying their other debts. These assertions are not
sufficient to satisfy the State's burden. The State fails to present any evidence of a scheme or
artifice. Moreover, delinquent payments are not sufficient to establish probable cause of an
intent to defraud. Finally, this Court finds that the fact that the Stonelys executed and recorded,
through their attorney, a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all obligations owed by the
Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's position that the Wallaces intended to defraud
the Stonelys. Therefore, the defendants' motion to dismiss Counts 4 and 10 is granted.
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V.

Counts 5 & 1L Pattern of Unlawful activity, are dismissed because the Wallaces do not
constitute an enterprise, nor does their conduct constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as
defined by statute.
Both defendants are charged with Pattern of Unlawful Activity. To bind over Pattern of

Unlawful Activity, the State must establish that probable cause exist that the Wallaces constitutes
an enterprise and of a pattern of unlawful activity. An "enterprise55 means any individual, sole
proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and any
union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and includes illicit as
well as licit entities.55 U.C.A. section 76-10-1602(1). The State contends that the Wallaces
constitute an enterprise under the statute, but the State fails to articulate how the Wallaces
constitute an enterprise, other than the mere fact that they are married to each. The State failed to
present any evidence or authority to establish thai a married couple constitutes an enterprise as
defined by the statute. In a recent case, the Utah Court of Appeals states that "[a]n 'association
in fact5 enterprise £is provided by evidence of an ongoing organization formal or informal, and by
evidence that the various associates function as a continuing unit.'55 State v. Bradshaw, 508
Utah.Adv. Rep. 12, 16 (Utah App. 2004)(citations omitted). An enterprise is a "continuing unit
for a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.55 State v. McGrattu 749 P.2d 631
(Utah App. 1988)(stating that the individuals had an ongoing association in fact for the purpose
of making money with the sale of drugs). The State cites no authority suggesting that marriage
creates an enteiprise. Courts have universally rejected attempts to extend the scope of
antiracketeering laws and to reject efforts "to dress a garden-variety fraud and deceit case in
RICO clothing.55 Bradshaw, 508 Utah.Adv. Rep at 16. This Court finds that the mere fact that
the Wallaces are married does not constitute an enterprise. It is the conclusion of this Court that
it was not the legislative intent to include marriages as an enterprise within the scope of the
statute scheme to constitute a pattern of unlawful activity as contemplate in U.C.A. section 7610-1602(1).
Furthermore, the Wallaces pattern of debt does not constitute unlawful pattern of activity
as described by the statute. The statute requires at least three episodes of unlawful activity,
which episodes are not isolated, but are the same or similar. Such activities that are prohibited
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are theft by deception or communication fraud. However, as stated previously, this Court finds
that the conduct of the Wallaces do not amount to acts of either commercial fraud or theft by
deception. Moreover, this Court finds that the defendants did not use or invest the money they
borrowed in a proscribed manner, as required by the statute. The "language of the statute is clear
that defendants] must 'use or invest5 the proceeds from the unlawful activity in the proscribed
manner, namely the 'acquisition,5 'establishment,' or 'operation of an 'enterprise.5'5 Id.; See
State v. Bell 770 P.2d 100, 103 n.2 (Utah 1988)(U[UPUAA} makes it a crime to use the profits
of racketeering activity to acquire or maintain an interest in an enterprise."); and Accord State v.
Hutchines, 950 P.2d 425, 430 (Utah Ct. App, 1997)("A [RICO} violation occurs not when the
defendant engages in the predicate acts, but only when he uses or invests the proceeds of that
activity in an enterprise,'")(citation omitted).
Therefore, this Court grants the Defendants motion to dismiss Counts 5 and 11, Pattern of
Unlawful Activity.

VI

COUNT 6, Theft by Deception, is dismissed because the State failed to show actual
deception by the defendant when he persuaded Mr. Horton to loan him $10.000.
Theft by deception requires that the State prove the defendant created or confirmed by

words or conduct a fact that is false, fails to correct a false impression that the defendant created
or confirmed by words or conduct that is not true, or promises performances that he does not
intend to preform. The State contends that Mr, Wallace committed a theft by deception by
entering into an agreement to have Mr. Horton make an investment of $10,000, without
intending to repay him. However, the only evidence the State presents to support its contention
is the defendant's failure to repay. The State did not provide any evidence regarding the nature
of the investment and whether the investment was fraudulent. There was no evidence presented
to establish whether there was either a fictitious investment project or whether the money was
actually invested but that the project failed to perform as had been expected by the Defendant
The fact that the money was not repaid is insufficient to establish an intent to deceive; the State
must present some evidence that a "big deal" was not legitimately expected by the defendant and
that the lack of repayment was not a result of commercial misfortune. Furthermore, there was
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testimony presented that the agreement between the defendant and Mr. Horton took place
simultaneously when the defendant and Mr Martinez entered into the identical agreement. Mr.
Martinez received full repayment of the loan's principal which supports the position that the
defendant possessed the intent to repay, rather than to deceive. In addition, there was evidence
presented at the preliminary hearing that there had been a history of paying debts to Mr.
Martinez.
The State failed to show that Mr. Wallace created, confirmed, or failed to correct a false
impression of fact that Mr. Horton would be repaid. Not every unfilled promise is turned into
deception. State v. Lakey, 659 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah 1983). A lack of repayment is insufficient
to establish probable cause that the defendant intended to defraud either Mr. Horton or Mr.
Martinez, This Court finds that there lacks probable cause to bindover Count 6 and that this
charge is dismissed.

VII

The State fails to provide sufficient facts for Count 9> Issuing a Bad Check.
This issue was not raised in either the State's or the Defendant's motion, nor was it

discussed in oral arguments. Since this Court was not given sufficient facts to determine the
nature of this charge, Count 9 is dismissed.

CONCLUSION
Based on the evidence presented to the Court at the Preliminary Hearing; Oral Arguments
and Memorandums, this Court finds that the State has been unable to establish probable cause for
each and every element of the charges. Moreover, this Court finds that the State failed to meet its
burden to show that the defendants conduct raised to the level of theft and fraud, rather than mere
commercial misfortune. Therefore this Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss all
counts. The Defendants are to prepare an order consistent with this ruling and submit it for the
Court's signature.
On a final note, it appears, based upon the facts of this case and the arguments presented
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by the State, that the State is making the statement that there should be a policy to criminally
charge individuals who run into financial difficulties, are unable to pay debts, file for bankruptcy,
have foreclosed on their mortgage, or who fail to meet their contractual obligations, and that
these debtors should be subject to criminal sanctions, along with any potential civil actions. In
these situations, there are often a multitude of unpaid debts to various creditors, however, it is
clear that the criminal courts are not the proper avenue to deal with these situations, nor should
they be used to convert ordinary civil debt into criminal restitution.

DATED this

<?

day of November, 2004.

BYT

STEVENEHHANSEN, JUDGE
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS'
MOTION TO DISMISS

vs.

CASENOS. 031403946,031403948

GEORGE WALLACE, and DEBORAH
WALLACE,
Defendants.

JUDGE STEVEN L. HANSEN

These matters came before the Court for preliminary hearing on April 7,2004.
Present were Dave Wayment appearing on behalf of the Plaintiff, Gunda Jarvis on behalf
of George Wallace ("George"), and Jennifer Go wans on behalf of Deborah Wallace
("Deborah"). The Court took the matter under advisement and allowed the parties to
brief issues relative to the bind-over. The Court issued its Memorandum Decision on
November 30, 2004, wherein it found that all charges should be dismissed because the
State failed to meet its burden of proof at the preliminary hearing, to wit:
Count 1, Issuing a Bad Check: The State failed to present any evidence that
Deborah drafted a check for payment with the purpose of receiving something
of value, or that she did so knowing that the check would not be honored due to
insufficient funds.
Counts 2 & 7, Issuing a Bad Check and Theft by Deception: Relative to
Count 2, the State failed to present any evidence of fraudulent intent when

Deborah instructed Morris Murdock Travel's agent to hold the check for a
period of time until sufficient funds were deposited into the account.
As to Count 7, Theft by Deception, the State failed to establish any
evidence that George created or confirmed by words or conduct a fact that was
false, or that he failed to correct a false impression that he created or confirmed
by words or conduct that was not true, or that he promised performance that he
did not intend to perform. Moreover, the evidence established that Ms. Warner
dealt exclusively with Deborah.
Counts 3 & 8, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, because the
monetary value that accrued in Utah was less than $5,000, the State is unable as
a matter of law to meet the value element of these charges. Further, the State
presented no evidence that the Defendants' communications were made with
any intent to defraud, or that the Wallaces engaged in a scheme or artifice. To
the contrary, Ms. Faux testified that she believed the Defendants acted in good
faith and were simply unable to meet their financial obligations due to
unforeseen economic hardship.
Counts 4 & 10, Communications Fraud: Relative to these counts, the State
has failed to establish any evidence of a scheme or artifice to defraud or to
obtain anything of value. Further, the undisputed fact that the Stonelys
executed and recorded a warranty deed expressly satisfying any and all
obligations owed by the Wallaces to the Stonelys is contrary to the State's
position that the Wallaces intended to defraud the Stonelys, or that the Wallaces
2

engaged in a scheme or artifice, or that they received anything of value.
Counts 5 & 11, Pattern of Unlawful Activity; The State has failed to establish
any evidence or cite to any authority that the Wallaces are an enterprise or that
their conduct constituted a pattern of unlawful activity as defined by statute.
The mere fact that the Wallaces are married is not sufficient to establish an
enterprise within the scope contemplated by Utah Code Ann. §76-10-1602(1).
Furthermore, the Wallaces' pattern of debt does not constitute a pattern of
unlawful activity as defined by the controlling statute; nor does it arise to the
level of criminal conduct, as previously noted herein. Moreover, the State has
completely failed to present any evidence that the defendants used or invested
the proceeds from the alleged illegal activity for the acquisition, establishment,
or operation of an enterprise.
Count 6, Theft by Deception: The State has failed to establish any evidence
that George had any intent to deceive Mr. Horton, or that George created,
confirmed, or failed to correct a false impression of fact regarding repayment, or
that the failure to repay was anything more than commercial misfortune.
Rather, the evidence showed that George intended to repay the loan. The mere
lack of repayment is insufficient to establish probable cause as to the essential
element of intent to defraud.
Count 9, Issuing a Bad Check: This issue was not raised in either the State's
or the Defendant's motion, and was not discussed at oral arguments. The Court
was not given sufficient facts to detennine the nature of this charge.
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In summary, each of the State's creditor-witnesses testified that the Wallaces
were expecting a large sum of money with which to pay all their debts. There was no
testimony or inference that this expectation was a misrepresentation. To the contrary, the
State's evidence includes that the Wallaces have a history of repaying their debts, they
signed a warranty deed returning residential property to the sellers after the Wallaces
made improvements, and that the Wallaces acted in good faith. None of the State's
witnesses testified that the Wallaces intended to defraud anyone, nor can the same be
inferred in light of the substantial evidence to the contrary. In short, this case represents
an improper attempt to use the criminal justice system as a means to collect a civil debt.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ORDERED that all the charges in the Information
are hereby dismissed.
BY THE COURT this 31

day of January, 2005.
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